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THE STABILIZATION  OF THE U.S.  ECONOMY: 
EVIDENCE  FROM  THE STOCK MARKET 
ABSTRACT 
Until  recently,  economists  widely  believed  that economic  activity  had 
become  less variable  in the United  States following  the end of World  War  II. 
Challenging  this  belief,  new research  suggests  that key historical  time 
series  are spuriously  volatile,  a finding that is highly  controversial. 
Data  from the stock  market  may provide  a vehicle  for resolving  the 
controversy.  Economic  theory  relates  stock  prices to  real  activity; 
empirical  tests  also show  a strong  link between  stock prices  and activity. 
Financial  data are accurately  measured  over long spans  of time and hence  are 
free  of most of  the measurement  problems  in other time series.  Measures  of 
stock  prices  show  no stabilization  in the post-World  War II  period relative 
to the pre-Worid  War I  or  pre-Depression  periods.  These  stock  market  data 
thus  support  the hypothesis  that  real  activity  has not been stabilized. 
Matthew  D,  Shapiro 
Cowles  Foundation  for 
Research  in  Economics 
Yale  University 
Box 2125  Yale Station 
New Haven,  CT  06520-2125 Is the apparent  stabilization  of  the post-war  U.S.  economy  a "Figment 
of  the data"  as Christina  Romer  suggests  in an important  series of papers?1 
The answer  to this question  has clear  and important  implications  for 
macroeconomic  analysis  and policy-making.  Major  economic  time series as 
officially  published  show clear  stabilization  in the post-World  War  II  era 
compared  to earlier  periods.  This (apparent)  fact is often  taken  as 
evidence  that  economic  policy  has been effective  in reducing  the magnitude 
of economic  fluctuations.2  The policies  include activist  monetary  and 
fiscal policy  and passive  built-in  stabilizers  such as progressive  income 
taxation,  unemployment  insurance,  and deposit  insurance. 
In studies of a wide range  of time series of interest  to 
macroeconomists  and policy  makers,  Romer finds  that  each series  is too 
volatile  in the early  data.  The excess  volatility  occurs  for different 
reasons  in the different  series;  Romer's findings  do not point  to a single 
methodological  difficulty  in the work of  early  researchers.  It is 
accidental  that  each series  is excessively  rather  than insufficiently 
volatile.  According  to Romer,  the main source of the excess  volatility  in 
the unemployment  series  is interpolations  of employment  and labor  force data 
that do not take into account the pro-cyclicality  of productivity  and 
'Romer  (1986a, b, c). 
2Bailey  (1978). -2- 
participation.  The main source  of the excess  volatility  in the GNP data is 
an overstatement  of co-movements  of GNP and output  of  commodities. 
Romer's  findings  have not gone  unquestioned.  David Weir (1986)  offers 
an analysis  of the original  unemployment  data that  does suggest 
stabilization  since  the end of World War II.  Nathan  Balke  and Robert Gordon 
(1986)  present  alternative  pre-1929  estimates  of GNP that also show 
stabilization.  They find that calculations  underlying  the original  GNP data 
did not overstate  the relationship  between  commodity  and non-commodity  GNP. 
Moveover,  they  offer  data  on railroad  transportation  and construction-- 
components  of non-commodity  GNP--that  are more  volatile  than commodity 
output. 
Further  and even more  detailed  study  of the underlying  data is perhaps 
needed  to resolve  the impasse.  I  am skeptical,  however,  that such research 
would help  most economists  frame  an opinion  concerning  the debate  unless  it 
were to lead  to a consensus.  The steps  in constructing  the data are 
complicated  and require  judgement.3  Ultimately,  only  the participants  in 
the debate  may be able  to make informed judgments  about  each of these 
detailed  steps  and how they color the final  answer.  Instead of reexamining 
the issues  raised  by Romer,  Weir,  and Balke  and Gordon,  I  propose  to examine 
the issue  by using  a completely  different  set of data,  but one that in 
theory  should  be very  useful  in resolving  the question  raised  by  Romer. 
I  propose  to use asset  price data  to study  the volatility  of  real 
activity  in the U.S.  economy  after World War  II relative  to earlier  periods. 
3For example,  some  of the difference  between  Romer  and Balke  and Gordon 
arises  through  the choice  of  years  for benchmarks. -3- 
Asset price data are particularly  well-suited  for addressing  this issue for 
several  reasons. 
First, asset  price  data are usually much better  measured  than  data on 
real economic  activity.  Aside  from issues of data alignment  and 
construction  of index  numbers,  there  is little  doubt  about what a time 
series  of asset market  data is measuring.  There  is no reliance  on survey  or 
census  data,  there is no need to interpolate  data  because  prices  are 
observed  virtually  continuously,  and there is relatively  little  scope  for 
judgement  in the compilation  of asset  market  statistics. 
Second, data on stock  prices  are readily available  over a long span on 
a consistent  basis.  There is no need to splice  together  series  constructed 
with  different  techniques  from  different  types  of data. 
Third, economic  theory  predicts  that there  should  be a strong  link 
between  economic  activity  and asset values.  The stock price is the 
discounted  present  value  of the firm's  payout.  Insofar as this payout  must 
ultimately  be a function  of real activity,  there  is a link between  real 
activity  and stock  prices. 
Finally,  studies  of the data confirm that stock  prices  are related  to 
real economic  activity.  Stock prices  are an important  component  in the U.S. 
Index of Leading  Indicators.4  The strong link  between  stock prices  and 
activity  has also  been  emphasized  recently  by  Stanley  Fischer  and Robert 
Merton (1984).  R. Officer  (1973)  finds  a  significant,  positive  relationship 
4See  Handbook  of Cyclical Indicators,  1984,  p. 68. -4- 
between  estimated  volatility  of aggregate  stock  prices  and industrial 
production  in post-World  War I  data.5 
If  the variance  of the fundamentals  is unchanged,  so should be the 
variance  of stock  returns.  Comparing  these  variances  seems an important 
step in answering  the question  raised by  Romer. 
I.  Link Between the Stock  Prices  and Economic  Activity 
This paper  exploits  the link between economic  activity  and the stock 
market  to learn  about  the volatility  of the economic  activity.  In this 
section,  I  discuss  the theoretical  linkage  between  stock  price  changes  and 
changes  in the fundamentals  and evaluate  some of the pitfalls  in making 
inferences  about  the distribution  of the fundamentals  from the distribution 
of asset market  data. 
In a simple  model,  Robert  Lucas (1978)  shows that there  is a unique 
relationship  between the level of economic  activity  and the value  of the 
stock  market.  The tight relationship  between  real activity  and asset 
prices  carries over  to more complicated  and realistic  models  where  no simple 
solutions  are available.  Yet, the lessons  from this paper  do not rely  upon 
a specific  model  of asset pricing.  The null  hypothesis  is that  the 
distribution  of the fundamentals  driving  the economy  has not changed.  The 
validity  of evaluating  that  hypothesis  by examining  asset  returns  only 
5Monthly  data on industrial  production  is available  beginning  in 1919. 
For this study, one could  envision  estimating  a relationship  between  output 
and stock  market  data in order  to translate  implications  for stock 
volatility  into those  for output  volatility.  Given  that  doubts  about  the 
accuracy  of the output  data  motivate  this study, that line of research  is 
not pursued  here. -5- 
requires  that the same  model  apply for all time  periods  of interest.  The 
power  of this approach  derives  from  the quality of the asset  market  data 
rather  than recourse  to a parametric  model  of the relationship  between 
fundamentals  and asset  prices. 
In the conventional  valuation  model,  stock  prices  are the present 
discounted  value  of future  dividends.  Despite doubts  raised  about  how well 
this model  fits  the data  [Robert Shiller  (1981)  and N. Gregory  Mankiw,  David 
Romer,  and Matthew  Shapiro  (1985)1,  as long as stock  values  bear some 
relation  to fundamental  values,  examination  of stock market  data should be 
useful in addressing  the question  of the volatility  of the fundamentals.  No 
rejections  of the conventional  valuation  model  suggest  the complete  absence 
of a relationship  between  real variables  and asset  prices.  Indeed, Sanford 
Grossman  and Shiller  (1981) find  that the consumption-based  version  of the 
conventional  valuation  model  is broadly  descriptive  of U.S. data at least 
over some sub-samples.  John Campbell  and Shiller  (1986) show  that there  is 
substantial  evidence  that price-dividend  ratio  reflects  the rational 
expectation  of future  dividends.  Finally,  as long as the departures  from 
the valuation  model  remain  the same in the two sub-samples,  testing whether 
asset  data have  equal  or greater  volatility  in the two samples  should be 
useful  in testing  whether  the process for the fundamentals  is the same in 
the sub-samples.6 
6All that is required  is that variance  of the "fad"  component  remains 
unchanged.  This assumption  is appropriate  in testing  the null  hypothesis  of 
no stabilization.  If  the fads component  has a high  variance,  the power of 
the tests  will,  however,  be low. An objection  to inferrtng  changes in real activity  from  changes  in 
market  value is that  the market  value represents  a long  average  of future 
real activity.  Consequently,  transitory  movements  in real  activity  will 
have little  effect  on market  value.  There is growing  evidence,  however, 
that changes  in output  are dominated  by permanent  or very  persistent 
components  [Charles Nelson  and Charles  Plosser  (1982) and Campbell  and 
Mankiw (1987)).  Under  this statistical  model  of  real  activity,  one would 
expect  a  tight relationship  between  innovations  in activity  and innovations 
in market  value. 
Changes  in corporate  financial  structure will change  the variability  of 
stock  prices  even if the variability  of the fundamentals  remains  unchanged 
[Fischer  Black (1976)).  Specifically,  an increase  in leverage  will  increase 
stock volatility.  Changes in leverage  could  therefore  cause  incorrect 
inferences  about the variability  of the fundamentals  from  the variability  of 
stock  returns.  Data  on the aggregate  corporate  balance  sheet are available 
in a National  Bureau  of Economic  Research  study  by Raymond  Goldsmith,  Robert 
Lipsey,  and Morris  Mendelson (1963) for selected  years  between 1900  and 1958 
and in the Federal  Reserve  Board's  Flow of Funds  Accounts  for  years since 
1946.  Table 1 gives debt-equity  ratios  for the aggregate  U.S.  nonfinancial 
corporate  sector  for certain  years  between  1900  and 1985.  This ratio is 
defined  as liabilities  divided by the difference  of assets  and liabilities. 
have been unable  to locate  balance  sheet  data for years prior  to 
1900. -7- 
Assets  are valued  at replacement  cost in current  dollars.8  In the years 
when the two series  overlap,  the Federal Reserve  Board's  series  gives  a 
substantially  lower  ratio.9  Yet, the series move together  closely in  years 
when each is available;  earlier data can be scaled  down for comparability. 
Table  1 shows  that  the debt-equity  ratio  is substantially  lower  during  the 
recent  period  compared  with  the earlier period.  This alone  should  make the 
stock  market more volatile  in the earlier period.  Changes  in leverage  bias 
tests  of the stabilization  hypothesis  using the stock returns data in favor 
of the alternative  that real  activity  has become  less variable in recent 
years. 
II.  Variables  and Data 
In this section,  I  discuss  the financial  variables  whose  volatility  I 
will  study  and the data used to measure  them.  I  also address data problems 
that  might arise  in using  these  series  to assess  changes  in  volatility.  The 
basic  measure  of volatility  of the stock market  will  be the standard 
deviation  of return on holding  the stock market.  The return--defined  as 
capital  gain plus dividend  yield--is  essentially  distributed  independently 
over time.  Hence,  the sample  variance  should  be an unbiased  estimate  of the 
ratio  is not the ratio  of debt to  the market  value  of  equity, 
which  is unavailable  in the Goldsmith,  Lipsey,  and Mendelson  data.  The use 
of replacement  cost  valuation  of equity  to make the leverage  comparisons 
across  the decades  is problematic  only if  the mean of Tobin's  q differs  over 
the sub-samples. 
9The  major  difference  between  the two balance  sheets  is that the FRB 
consolidates  the corporate  sector  by netting out most intra-sectoral  assets 
(mainly  securities)  while the NBER  researchers  do not net out these  assets. 
See Goldsmith,  Lipsey,  and Mendelson,  1963, p. 24. -8- 
population  variance.'0 The raw stock market  return  is a nominal  variable. 
Several  approaches  are taken to obtaining  a real  measure.  The real  return 
can be measured  by deflating  dividends  and the stock  prices  by appropriate 
price  deflators.  Although  this produces  a theoretically  valid measure of 
the real return,  it does  introduce  non-financial  data into the calculation. 
The excess  return  on the stock  market  over  a short  nominal  interest  rate  can 
be measured  by financial-market  data alone.  Finally,  the nominal  stock 
return  is of independent  interest.  The in  of the rate of inflation  has 
clearly  changed  over  the last century.11  If  the variance  of inflation  is 
unchanged  over  the two periods,  one can compare  the variance  of the nominal 
stock  returns  over  the two periods  as long as they are computed  about 
different  means.  In any case,  the excess,  real,  and nominal  stock returns 
yield  very similar  results. 
I also  consider  the price-dividend  ratio.  The price-dividend  ratio  is 
an attractive  measure  of  movements  in the stock  market  for two reasons. 
First, the price-dividend  ratio  can be stationary  even if neither  variable 
is.  Hence,  the price-dividend  ratio  is a measure  of the level of the stock 
market  that  has a well-defined  variance.  Second,  it is intrinsically  a real 
measure. 
In addition  to these  returns  variables,  I  present  statistics  showing 
movements  in dividends. The dividend  is ultimately  tied to the profits  of 
'0See Mankiw,  Romer,  and Shapiro  (1985)  and Marsh  and Merton  (1986) for 
a discussion  of how serial  correlation  in measures  of the igyi  of stock 
prices  (such as Shiller,  1981) can lead  to serious  bias in estimates  of 
volatility. 
11Robert  Barsky  (1987)  argues persuasively  that the mean inflation  rate 
was essentially  zero  before  1914. -9- 
the underlying  capital,  so it is potentially  an interesting  indicator  of 
activity.  But the year-to-year  link between the two may be weak if 
corporate  dividend  policy  makes dividends  respond  slowly to changes  in 
profits.  I  examine  this  issue  in the next section.  I present  results  for 
both log detrended  and percent  change  in dividends  because  of the 
difficulty  of establishing  which  procedure  is the appropriate  transformation 
to render  the series  stationary.12 
In summary,  the stock  returns--nominal,  real, and excess--are  the major 
variables  to be  examined.  These  are supplemented  by the price-dividend 
ratio and measures  of change  in  dividends.  I  now turn to a discussion  of 
the specific  data  used to measure  these  variables. 
The statistics  are computed  for the period  1872 through  1987 and for 
various  sub-periods.  Although  the underlying  data are measured  monthly,  I 
consider  variances  measured  for annual  data.'3  The stock price is an index 
of industrial  stocks.  The stock  price  index refers to the month  of  January. 
For 1871 through  1925, the data are Cowles's  (1939) All Stocks  Index  (series 
P-i).  Since  1926,  they are the Standard  and Poor's  Composite,  which  extends 
Cowles's  series.  The dividend  data give the total  dividends  during  the year 
(Cowles's  series  Da_l for 1871 through  1925 and the Standard  and Poor's 
'2Campbell  and Shiller  (1986)  reject  the hypothesis  that log dividends 
have  a unit root in favor  of a trend stationary  alternative.  They find, 
however,  that the log dividend-price  ratio is trend stationary  while  log 
prices  are not.  As they  point  out,  these  three  findings  are inconsistent. 
13More  precise  estimates  of the variance  of stock  price growth  can be 
obtained  by using  higher  frequency  data,  but the dividend  data required  to 
compute  the returns  are only  available  annually  in the early  period. 
Variances  of stock price  growth  computed  from  the monthly  data show  the same 
pattern  across  time as the annual  returns data used  in this paper. -  10  - 
series  since  1926).  The returns  are calculated  for holding the index  from 
January to January  and are expressed  as percentages.14 
Except  for the possibilities  of errors  in the transcription  of the raw 
data underlying  these  series or arithmetic  errors  in constructing  these 
series, we can be confident  that these  stock market  data are accurate 
measures.'5 The monthly  Cowles  index  is the average  of  the high and low for 
the month rather  than the average of all the days.  This procedure  does  not 
introduce  important  bias into  the variance  of the annual  returns  measure.'6 
The firms  represented  in the stock market  index  do  not create  all the 
output  of the economy.  Consequently,  how well  the stocks  in the index 
represent  the economy  as a whole needs to be  evaluated.  The most dramatic 
change in the economy  over the sample period  is the reduction  in  the 
'4The  return  is 
100((Pt+, 
+ Dt)/Pt 
- 1)  where Pt 
is the January  price 
and Dt is the calendar-year  dividend.  The price-dividend  ratio  is defined 
as 
Pt/Dt_i. 
'5Jack  Wilson  and Charles Jones  (1987)  examine  the monthly Cowles  price 
index  for coding  errors.  They appear  to have found  an error in the June 
1884 price.  They also find  problems  in the Cowles  cumulative  returns 
series.  They  do not find  problems  with the data  used in this paper. 
'6To  check  this,  I  carried  out a simple  simulation.  I generated  data 
assuming  stock  prices followed  a geometric  random  walk at daily  frequency 
with an innovation  standard  deviation  of 16.0 percent  annual  rate.  I 
generated  data for forty years  of data  with 300 days per year.  I  then 
computed  the standard  deviation  of the "January"  to "January"  returns  using 
the Cowles  and Standard  and Poor  procedures  for obtaining  monthly  data. 
For Cowles,  the January  value  was taken  to be the average  of the minimum  and 
maximum  observation  during  the first twenty-five  days of the year;  for the 
Standard  and Poor,  January was taken  to be the average  of the first  25  days. 
In 1000  replications,  the mean absolute deviation  of the standard  deviation 
of the return  measured  by either  the Cowles  or Standard  and Poor procedure 
averaged  about  three  percent  of  the true  standard  deviation. -  11  - 
importance  of agriculture.  At the beginning  of the sample,  over half  of 
output  was in the agricultural  sector;  at the end,  it was about  two 
percent.'7 Clearly,  farms  are not traded on the stock exchange  although  the 
returns  to industrial  companies  are likely  to be affected  by agricultural 
shocks.  That stock market  data exclude  the direct  contribution  of the farm 
sector  is probably  a virtue.  The debate  over the stabilization  of the 
economy  centers  on changes  in government  policies  and institutions  that are 
unlikely  to affect year-to-year  movements  in agricultural  output.  Hence, 
it is appropriate  to use measures  that apply  to the industrial  sector  as 
evidence  in the stabilization  debate. 
Within  the industrial  sector  and within  the stock market index,  the 
composition  of  firms  has changed  over  the sample.  For example,  railroads 
were much  more important  in the earlier  period  than they have been  in the 
recent  period.  Changes  in the mix of stocks  in the  index should  reflect 
changes  in the mix of economic  activity.  To make inferences  about the 
volatility  of the fundamentals  from  the volatility  of asset  returns  requires 
that that relationship  between  the returns  on the major  companies  in the 
economy  and the underlying  economic  activity  has not changed  over the sample 
period.  This  maintained  hypothesis  seems an appropriate  component  of the 
complicated,  composite  hypothesis  that the volatility  of the economy  in 
unchanged.  Nonetheless,  the limited  coverage  of the stock  price  index  and 
of the stock  market  itself  is a drawback  of the approach  in this paper. 
'71n 1869,  agricultural  output  was 2.54 billion  dollars  and total 
output  was 4.83 (Historical  Statistics,  series F238 and F240).  In 1986, 
agricultural  output  was 93.0  billion  dollars  and the total was 4,235.0 
billion dollars (Economic  Report of the President  1988, Table  8-10). -  12  - 
To  obtain  a  real  return,  stock prices  are deflated  by an index of the 
monthly  wholesale  price  and dividends  by an index for the calendar  year. 
For 1871-1889,  the price index is the George  Warren  and Frank  Pearson  (1935, 
Table 1) series.'8 Since 1890,  it is the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics 
Wholesale  Price  Index  (now  called  the Producer  Price  Index))9  The stock 
price is deflated  by  the January  price  index; the dividend  by the calendar 
year index.  Deflating  by this price  index might introduce  a number  of 
problems in calculation  of the returns  volatility.  Measured  price  indexes 
might be too stable if they  are based on posted or administered  prices 
rather  than  market  prices.  On the other  hand,  the producer  price index 
might be an excessively  volatile  measure  of inflation.  First, producer 
prices  are more variable  than  consumer  prices,  at least  in recent  data.2° 
Second,  there  is an important  bias in the retrospective  work to construct 
the historical  data.  The price data that is easily  collected  tends  to be on 
commodities  that are traded  in asset  markets.  These  commodity  prices  are 
certainly  more  volatile  than average  producer  prices.  Therefore,  it is very 
difficult  even  to sign the bias in the volatility  of the inflation  rate.  In 
'8The  annual Warren  and Pearson  series  is also in  Historical  Statistics 
of the United  States,  Series  E-52. 
19The  annual wholesale  price index is Series  E-23 in Historical 
Statistics.  The monthly  series  is in the BLS LABSTAT  file beginning  in 
1913.  The monthly  series from 1890  through  1912 is from Bureau  of Labor 
Statistics,  Index  Number  of Wholesale  Prices  on Pre-War  Base.  1890-1927 
(Washington:  GPO,  1928). 
20Over  1948  through  1988, the standard deviation  of  annual  inflation 
(January  to January)  is 5.4 percent measured  by the Producer  Price Index  and 
3.5 percent  by the Consumer  Price Index. -  13  - 
practice,  the volatility  of  the nominal  returns  swamps  the inflation 
volatility  in the calculation  of  real  returns. 
Moreover,  as noted  above,  consideration  of the excess return  avoids 
having  to introduce  measurement  errors  in a price  index.  For this  span of 
data,  the short  term commercial  paper  rate provides  a measure of a short 
term,  low-risk  interest  rate.  The interest  rate  is the annual  six-month 
commercial  paper  rate on a bank discount  basis  published  in the Federal 
Reserve  Bulletin.  It is linked  to the four  to six month commercial  paper 
rate  in Milton Friedman  and Anna Schwartz  (1982). 
III.  Results 
The basic  facts  about  the variability  of the asset  market  data emerge 
clearly  in Figures  1  through  5,  which  present  the levels  and rolling 
estimates  of the standard  deviations  of the excess  and real stock  returns, 
the price-dividend  ratio, dividend  growth,  and detrended  dividends.  The 
level  of the series  are plotted as solid lines.  The standard  deviations  of 
the series  are computed  over rolling,  eleven year sample  intervals.  These 
are plotted  as broken  lines at the mid-point  of the intervals.  There  is no 
apparent  stabilization  of either  the real  or excess  stock  returns,  although 
volatility  increased  in the  inter-war  period.21  The price-dividend  ratio  is 
21Officer  also finds  that  the Depression  years  were especially 
volatile.  He emphasizes  that stabilization  of  the stock  market  following 
the Depression  cannot  be attributed  to  the creation  of  the Securities 
Exchange  Commission  because  post-World  War II  volatility  is no greater  than 
that  in the first  two decades  of the twentieth  century.  G. William  Schwert 
(1987)  finds  that high frequency  changes  in stock  volatility  are not closely 
related  to changes  in volatility  of either  macroeconomic  variables  or 
leverage.  He does  find  increases  in volatility  during  the  inter-war  period. -  14  - 
more  volatile  in  recent  years.22  Dividend  growth alone  does show some 
stabilization  after World  War I!. 
Sample  statistics  confirm  what  the eye sees  in the figures.  Table  2 
gives  the sample  standard  deviations  of the series for the entire  sample  and 
for selected  sub-samples.  The sub-samples  are 1872-1913,  1872-1929,  1914- 
1946,  and 1947-1987.  The first  two sub-samples  are based  on alternative 
ending  dates for the earlier  period.  The first  sub-sample  ends with  the 
beginning  of World  War I,  the collapse  of the classical  gold standard,  and 
the founding  of the Federal  Reserve.  The second sub-sample  ends with the 
stock  market  crash.  The third sub-sample  includes  the turbulent  years  from 
the beginning  of World  War I  through  the recession  following  World  War II. 
The  standard  deviations  of  both real  stock  returns  and of the price- 
dividend  ratio  are lower in the early period  (ending  in either  1913 or  1928) 
than in the period  after  World  War II.  Excess  returns  have  about the same 
variability  in the earlier  periods  and the recent  period.  The variability 
of the stock  market  is consistent  with the hypothesis  that real  activity  in 
the U.S. has not been stabilized.  Only  dividend  growth shows  substantial 
stabilization  in the recent  period. 
22Note  that changes  in the price-dividend  ratio  presented  in Figure  3 
can be interpreted  in terms of  changes  in the required  rate  of return.  High 
price-dividend  ratios  correspond  to low required  rates  of  return.  Figure 3 
suggests  that  the required  rate of  return  was lower in the post-World  War II 
period  than in the pre-World  War I  period,  but that both the early  and later 
periods  had lower required  rates  of return  than the middle  period.  James 
Poterba  and Lawrence  Sunvners  (1986)  examine the relationship  between 
volatility,  stock returns,  and the required  rate  of return.  They find 
volatility  changes  are not persistent  enough  to yield  large  changes  in the 
required  rate  of return. -  15  - 
Table  3 gives formal  tests  of the null hypothesis  that the variance  of 
the series  in the 1872-1913  and  1947-1987  sub-samples  are the same.  The 
first  column  presents  the ratio  of the variances  in the two sample  periods. 
The second  column  gives  a test statistic  for the hypothesis  that the 
variances  are equal.23  The third  column  gives one minus  the probability  of 
rejecting  that the variances  are equal.  The test  statistics  confirm what 
is apparent  from  the figures  and from  Table  2.  Only for dividend  growth  can 
one come close  to rejecting  the hypothesis  that  the variance  of the series 
are the same in favor  of the hypothesis  that  it is smaller  in the more 
recent data.24 
Of the asset  market  data,  only dividend  growth  shows  stabilization  in 
the post-War  period.  Dividends  paid are ultimately  constrained  by the real 
return on the underlying  asset.  But as Marsh  and Merton  (1986)  stress,  the 
timing  of dividend  payments  is  largely  at the discretion  of  management.  The 
smoothing  of dividends  in the post-War  period  may well reflect  a change in 
23Because  the series may be serially  correlated  (serial correlation  is 
non-trivial  in the price-dividend  ratio and the dividend  series),  Goldfeld- 
Quandt  tests  of equal  variance  are not appropriate.  The probabilities 
reported in Table 3 are for a test that is valid  under very general  forms  of 
serial  correlation.  It is constructed  by regressing  squared  deviations  from 
sub-sample  means  on dummies  for the sub-periods  and testing  whether  the 
dummies  have equal  coefficients.  The test statistic  is based on a 
covariance  matrix  corrected  for heteroskedasticity  and autocorrelation  (8- 
quarter  lags) within  the sub-sample  but assuming  that observations  are 
uncorrelated  across  sub-samples.  See Donald  Andrews  and Ray Fair 
(forthcoming)  for a general  treatment  of  tests  for structural  change with 
heterogenous  processes. 
24The  test for real dividend  growth  illustrates  the importance  of 
taking  into account  the serial  correlation  in the time series.  Even though 
the variance  of  real  dividend  growth  is half of  its pre-World  War I  value  in 
the post-World  War II period,  the difference  is not statistically 
significant  using  conventionally-sized  tests. -  16  - 
dividend policy  rather  than  a change in the underlying  driving  process. 
Suppose  that  managers,  for example,  decided  to spread over several years 
changes  in dividends  that  would  have previously  been  made over  one year. 
This change  in policy  would  have little effect  on the distribution  of stock 
returns.  Yet  it would  reduce  the variance  and  increase the persistence  of 
year-to-year  changes  in dividends.  It is clear from  the Figure  4 that the 
serial  correlation  of the dividend  growth  has increased  since  World 
War il.25  This increased  serial  correlation  is consistent  with more 
smoothing  of dividend  changes.  Tables 2 and 3 include  statistics  for the 
change  in dividends  measured  over four  years  (expressed  at annual  rate). 
Although  there  is a decline  in the variability  of this series,  it is much 
smaller  than  for the year-to-year  changes. 
Finally,  all the measures  considered  show  dramatic  increases  in 
volatility  in the period  between the beginning  of World  War I and the end of 
World  War II.  The finding  accords with the volatile  history  of that period 
(the roaring  twenties,  the Great  Depression,  the World  War  II boom).  The 
participants  in the debates  over  the historical  economic  data do not dispute 
that this period saw an increase  in volatility  of  real  activity. 
Additionally,  the large  decline  in the value  of the stock  market  itself  at 
the onset  of the Depression  would itself  increase  volatility  through  the 
leverage  effect. 
251he  first  order  serial correlation  of dividend  growth  is essentially  zero in the early  period  and is 0.30 in the later  period. -  17  - 
IV.  Discussion 
The previous  section documents  that stock  market  returns  show  no 
reduction  in variance  when  the pre-Worid  War I or pre-Depression  periods  are 
compared  to the post-World  War II period.  The lack of stabilization  in 
stock  prices  supports  the view that  activity  has not been stabilized. 
It is inappropriate,  of  course,  to offer evidence  of the inability  to 
reject  a hypothesis  as evidence  for the hypothesis.  Indeed,  if  one believes 
that the stock market  is determined  by fads  or will o' wisps"  one might 
maintain  that  the test lacks  power  against the alternative  that the variance 
of the fundamentals  has changed.  The variance  of fundamentals  could  be 
overwhelmed  by the variance  of the fad component.  In the worst  case,  all 
changes in stock market  value are caused  by  speculative  bubbles,  but there 
is, as discussed  above, evidence  that does  link the fundamentals  to stock 
prices.  Indeed,  about  forty  to seventy  percent of the standard  deviation  of 
the log dividend-price  ratio can be explained  by the rational  expectation  of 
future  dividends  and interest  rates  in the context of the conventional 
valuation  model.26  Given that the size  of any fad component  is thus 
circumscribed,  the tests  presented  in this paper should  have power  against 
the alternative  that the variance  of the fundamentals  has changed. 
Another  issue  of  power may arise  if  the stochastic  process  for output 
has shifted  during  the sample.  The greater  the persistence  of the shocks to 
the fundamentals,  the more the stock  market  will respond  to an innovation  of 
26See  Campbell  and Shiller  (1986).  Note that  this finding  is put 
forward  by a strong  proponent  of fads models  [Shiller  (1984)].  Campbell  and 
Shiller  (1988) do find that a lower  fraction  of variance  in the 
dividend-price  ratio  is explained  when a  long  moving  average  of earnings  is 
included  in the information  set. -  18  - 
a given  size.  Campbell  and Mankiw (1987)  find evidence  that the persistence 
in shocks to output growth  has  increased  in the U.S.  since  World  War II. 
Consider  the implications  of the persistence  of output  fluctuations  for the 
relationship  between  variance  of  output and variance  of stock returns.  The 
more persistent  are changes  in the fundamentals,  the greater  does the 
variance  of stock  returns  magnify  the variance  of innovations  in the 
fundamentals.  Conversely,  if the fundamentals  are negatively 
autocorrelated,  the stock  return  will  respond  little to an innovation  in the 
fundamentals.  In the limiting  case  where shocks to the fundamentals  are 
perfectly  transitory,  for example,  where  a shock  this period  is offset  by a 
shock of equal  and opposite  present  value  the next period,  changes  in 
fundamentals  lead  to virtually  no changes  in stock  values.  Suppose 
macroeconomic  stabilization  policies  have reduced  the variation  in output  by 
attenuating  high frequency,  negatively  autocorrelated  changes  in output.27 
Under this view  of policy,  stabilization  of output  would  leave  the 
distribution  of stock  returns relatively  unchanged,  but year-to-year  output 
changes  could be reduced  substantially.  Hence,  if  stabilization  policy 
operates  only at the short  end of the spectrum,  stabilization  may have been 
effective,  but would  go undetected  by  the tests  in this paper.  This line of 
reasoning  also suggests that the debate over stabilization  should  focus more 
on high frequency  movements  in output rather  than on  total  variability. 
Doing  so will  be  difficult  given  the weakness  and relatively  low frequency 
27Dividend  growth  clearly  shows  greater  persistence  and lower 
innovation  variance  in recent  years.  As noted  above, this  change  in the 
stochastic  process  for dividends  could  be caused  by a change  in firms' 
dividend  policies. 19  - 
of the existing  data.  In any case, the findings  of this paper  rule out 
stabilization  at the long end of the spectrum.  Any defence  of the 
stabilization  hypothesis  must therefore  point  to high frequency  output 
fluctuations  in the early  period  that  have disappeared  in recent  years. 
In suninary,  financial  data  provide  an excellent  vehicle  for testing 
whether  real  activity  has been stabilized  when the direct data  on real 
activity  are suspect.  The financial  data are available  over a long span, 
are accurately  measured,  and are related  in theory  and in practice  to real 
activity.  Stock returns  since World  War II have essentially  the same 
variance as in earlier  periods.  Given  the evidence  that innovations  in 
output  are essentially  permanent,  the constant  variance  of stock  returns 
supports  Romer's  important  finding  that  the stabilization  of the post-Wor'd 
War II economy  is illusory. -  20 
- 
Table  1 
Debt-Equity  Ratio 
Nonfinancial  Corporate  Sector 
NBER  FRB 
1900  0.753 
1912  1.004 
1922  0.733 
1929  0.731 
1933  0.884 
1939  0.756 
1945  0.542 
1946  0.508  0.321 
1950  0.473  0.305 
1955  0.496  0.317 
1958  0.506  0.328 
1960  0.355 
1965  0.418 
1970  0.464 
1975  0.378 
1980  0.351 
1985  0.468 
Sources:  NBER:  Goldsmith,  Lipsey  and Mendelson, 1963, Tables I  and 
Ia, ratio  of line 111-14  to line IV.  fR:  Balance Sheets for the U.S. 
Economy,  line 41. - 21  - 
Table 2 
Standard  Deviations  of Stock  Market  Data 
entire  sub- 
samole  samoles 
1872-  1872-  1872-  1914-  1947- 
1987  1913  1929  1946  1987 
nominal  stock  return  18.1  15.3  16.3  24.0  15.2 
excess  stock  return  18.7  15.8  16.9  24.2  16.3 
real  stock return  17.9  14.1  16.0  23.2  16.8 
price-dividend  ratio  5.8  4.3  4.5  4.7  6.6 
real  dividend  growth  12.4  10.9  12.5  18.2  7.5 
real  dividend  growtha 
6.2  5.3  6.6  9.2  4.2 
over four years 
real  log dividends,  19.8  14.7  19.3  26.3  17.2 
detrended 
aFour  year growth  rates expressed  as annual rates.  Sub-samples 
begin in 1875,  1917,  and 1950 to allow  for extra lags. -  22  - 
Table  3 
Tests of Constant  Variance 
1872-1913  versus 1947-1987 
variance  ratiob  X2(l)c  probabilityd 
nominal  stock return  1.01  <0.01  0.96 
excess stock  return  0.94  0.07  0.79 
real  stock return  0.71  3.16  0.08 
price-dividend  ratio  0.42  13.89  <0.01 
real  dividend growth  2.09  2.29  0.13 
real dividend growths  1.62  1.12  0.29 
over four  years 
real log dividends,  0.73  0.58  0.45 
detrended 
aSee note a,  Table 2. 
bRatio of variance  for 1872-1913  to 1947-1987. 
cTest statistic  for hypothesis  that variances  are equal  (see fn.  23). 
dOne minus the probability  of rejecting  the null  hypothesis  that the 
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